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1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at a workshop on the poor law, Oxford Brookes 
University, 27th April 2007.  I thank, without implicating, workshop participants, and Mary Daly, 
Peter Gray, Niall Ó Ciosáin, and Peter Solar for comments on an earlier draft, and Tim Guinnane 
for earlier collaborations. INTRODUCTION 
It has been proposed by some to establish poor-laws in Ireland; but, from the 
wretched and degraded state of the common people, and the total want of 
decent pride, which in England prevents so many from having recourse to 
parish assistance, there is little reason to doubt, that, on the establishment of 
such laws, the whole of the landed property would very soon be absorbed, 
or the system be given up in despair.  
Malthus, Essay on Population (2th edition)2
 
Poverty in Ireland was almost certainly more prevalent in 1838, when the Irish Poor 
Law was passed, than in 1803, when Malthus made the glum prognosis cited above.  
Nonetheless, during the admittedly short interval between 1838 and the Great Famine the 
impact of the poor law was very different from what he had predicted.   
The Poor Law (Ireland) Act of 1838, closely modeled on the New Poor Law of 1834, 
envisaged the creation of administrative units called ‘unions’ centered on market towns 
and of a size that would be consistent with most paupers living within walking distance of 
a union workhouse (see Nicholls 1856; Hall & Hall 1843: III, 336-60; O’Brien 1982, 1985; 
Kinealy 1995: 104-7).  The act delegated responsibility at the local level for union 
management to boards of guardians, the majority of whom were to be elected by 
ratepayers.3  The boards were ultimately responsible to a Poor Law Commission based in 
Dublin.  130 unions were eventually declared.  They ranged in geographical size from 
38,917 acres (Dublin North) to 507,154 acres (Ballina) and in population from 18,571 
(Dunfanaghy) to 178,745 (Dublin South).  The Commissioners aimed to spread the work of 
                                                 
2 In later editions Malthus later changed ‘wretched and degraded’ to ‘depressed’, and omitted the 
passage about pride and parish assistance. 
3 The new system was the first to offer the ‘strong’ farming class a political voice (e.g. Grace 2000: 
22-3).  Later it would play a key role in the land struggle (Feingold 1984). 
  1workhouse construction evenly throughout the country, so as not to affect building costs 
in any particular region unduly (Nicholls 1856: 260).  By late March 1841 115 out of a total 
of 130 workhouses were contracted for, and built or being built (Nicholls 1856: 259). 
Although the creation of workhouses proceeded more slowly in the poorer regions 
of Ireland, the new regime was functioning across most of the island before the impact of 
the potato blight began to bite.4  Total poor law expenditure even in 1846 (£0.4 million) 
was small relative to the annual gross rental income of landlords (about £12 million), and 
about £60,000 of that was spent in the mainly urban unions of Cork, Belfast, and Dublin 
North and South.  Total expenditure up to 1846 was only £1.9 million.   
Far from being overwhelmed by paupers undeterred by the principle of ‘less 
eligibility’, few of the new workhouses were stretched in the early years.  During the first 
quarter of 1844, just over fifty thousand paupers were relieved in workhouses designed to 
hold twice that number, while 36,381 remained on the last day of the quarter.  Eighty-five 
of the 124 workhouses open on New Year’s Day 1846 were less than half full, and the 
occupancy rate was eighty per cent or more in only ten of those.  Moreover, paradoxically, 
pressure on accommodation was higher and turnover was lower in better-off unions (i.e. 
those with a high poor law valuation per head).5  The only workhouses that were full or 
nearly full on at the beginning of 1846 were those in the mainly urban unions of Cork, 
Belfast, Dublin North and South, and Waterford.  At the other end (but excluding 
                                                 
4 For recent analyses of the Famine see e.g. Donnelly 2002; Ó Gráda 1999; Kinealy 1994. 
5 ‘Pressure’ is defined as the number of inmates on New Year’s Day 1846 as a proportion of 
capacity.  ‘Turnover’ is defined as the number of admissions during 1846 divided by the number of 
inmates at the beginning of the year.  The correlations were 0.512 (PLV per head and ’pressure’) 
and -0.338 (PLV per head and ‘turnover’). 
  2workhouses that had opened in 1845) were Ballinrobe, Bantry, Castlebar, Inishowen, and 
Stranorlar.  In these workhouses the number of inmates ranged from 12 per cent 
(Ballinrobe) to 18 per cent of capacity (Stranorlar).  Alternatively, excluding the five 
‘urban’ unions and those not yet open at the end of 1844, the occupancy rate at the 
beginning of 1846 was only 0.45.  Defining turnover as the ratio of the total number 
admitted during 1846 to the number in the workhouse on 1st January 1846, turnover was 
highest in Fermoy, Dunfanaghy, and Lowtherstown (today’s Irvinestown) (ratios over 20), 
and lowest in Baltinglass, Naas, and Shillelagh (ratios less than 2).  
Even by the end of March 1846 the workhouses still contained fewer than fifty 
thousand inmates. Nor were most of those admitted feckless loafers, as Malthus and his 
followers feared.  In the first three months of 1844 three in five of them were children aged 
under fifteen, while the  ‘infirm or diseased’ inmates included 1,311 cripples, 1,292 ‘idiots’, 
and 706 who were blind or nearly so (Ó Gráda 1999: 51).  In an age when most people 
married, over one-third of the adults relieved were single men and women without 
children.6  The Halls, who, ‘suddenly and unexpected’, visited several workhouses in the 
course of their tours during the summers of 1841 and 1842, found few able-bodied 
paupers in them, and ‘literally none of the male sex’; and ‘where we noticed women 
capable of labour, we found that their children were invariably inmates of another ward’ 
(Hall & Hall 1843: III, 356).  Malthus and his followers had misjudged the nature of Irish 
poverty: before the Famine most the Irish poor ‘prefer[red] the freedom of their precarious 
                                                 
6 The data on inmates in 1844 are taken from the Tenth Annual Report of the Poor Law Commissioners 
(London, 1844). 
  3trade to the dismal certainty within [workhouse] walls’ (W.M. Thackeray as cited in 
Hickey 2002: 109).   
With the intensification of the Famine, however, the workhouses were faced with 
awesome responsibilities not envisaged in 1838.  By mid-October 1846 four workhouses 
were already full to capacity, and admissions continued to increase so fast that 
workhouses in the worst hit regions were being forced to refuse admissions by the end of 
the year.  The peak in admissions reached at the end of February 1847 reflected a capacity 
and public health constraints, not a peak in the crisis.  Numbers would rise again later as 
more accommodation was made available. 
To make matters worse, from mid-1847 on poor law system bore the main brunt of 
public famine relief.  Irish landlords in the west of Ireland, many of them already in severe 
financial difficulty due to years of living beyond their means, were in no position to fund 
the necessary relief expenditure (Eiríksson and Ó Gráda 2006).  The workhouses, which 
were intended to alleviate poverty and mitigate mortality, witnessed one quarter or so of 
all famine deaths.  Many could not cope, unable either to raise the funds necessary for 
day-to-day maintenance or prevent mortality from escalating.  During the famine years 
the Poor Law Commissioners dismissed over thirty boards of guardians, and replaced 
them by paid, full-time vice-commissioners. 
The geographical size of unions mattered.  In the cases of Ballina and Tralee unions, 
in particular, the destitute living in areas far from the workhouse suffered particularly 
badly.  The Tralee guardians warned parish wardens from Dingle electoral district against 
sending them any more paupers in February 1847; towards the end of the year they agreed 
  4to the erection of a temporary workhouse in Dingle since the poor were ‘perfectly unable’ 
for the 30-40 mile journey east (NLI, Ms. 7,860?). 
A key weakness of the system was the total reliance of workhouses on a system of 
local taxation for their upkeep.  Already in October 1846 unions were rejecting applicants 
for the want of funds, and nearly all unions in Connacht were in financial difficulties ‘as it 
was almost impossible to get any one to pay 1s. of any rent or tax’.  The Commissioners 
deemed the payment of interest on funds borrowed to finance current expenditure illegal, 
prompting poor law commissioner Edward Twistleton to propose (in confidence) that the 
government pay the interest charges on any private borrowing (IUP1, p. 1, Twistleton to 
Gray, 26th Oct 1846).  During the Famine, indebtedness was linked to poverty.  The 
correlation between debt per head in October 1847 and average poor law valuation per 
head was -0.36 (n=130); in September 1848 it was –0.24.  Indebtedness due to heavy 
outgoings and unpaid rates severely constrained the ability of the workhouses to relieve 
the poor during the Famine. 
The sesquicentennial of the Great Famine in the mid-1990s prompted the 
publication of several excellent studies of individual workhouses (e.g. Ó Cathaoir 1994; 
Byrne 1995; Ó Canainn 1995; Murphy 1996: 60-80; MacAtasney 1997a, 1997b; Ó 
Murchadha 1997; Grace 2000; O’Brien 2000).  In addition, the main focus of the 
government-funded National Famine Research Project, which had its origins in an 
unsuccessful attempt in the early 1990s to seek funding from the British ESRC, was on a 
range of poor law unions.  The choice of unions was intended to be pragmatic rather than 
scientific, with the objective of representing as broad a range of ‘outcomes’ as possible.  
  5The choice of unions depended on two criteria: the availability of documentation and 
geographical spread.  In the end those selected were Ennistymon, Dublin North, 
Enniskillen, Kinsale, Parsonstown (today’s Birr), Thurles, Ballina, Inishowen, and 
Rathdrum.  The aim of the NFRP was to further the study of the Famine through local 
studies, rather than to focus on the management of unions per se.  Reports on all unions 
except Kinsale were completed, and digitized versions of at least some of them are being 
made available to scholars soon.7  Although the intended aggregative analysis based on 
the individual case studies was not done, two of the project leaders have invoked some of 
the case studies in their later work (e.g. Daly 2007; Ó Gráda 1999; Guinnane and Ó Gráda 
2002a, 2002b; Guinnane, McCabe, and Ó Gráda 2004).   
Both the individual studies listed above and those conducted under the auspices of 
the NFRP highlighted many instances of callous behaviour towards the famine poor.  For 
example, Andrés Eiríksson’s analysis of Parsonstown’s indoor relief register for 1849 
shows that nearly two-thirds of those who died in the workhouse did so between the third 
and sixth week after admission.  This prompted the cautious suggestion from Eiríksson 
that ‘rather than being sick on admission most inmates became ill…very soon after 
entering the house’ (Eiríksson 1996a: Ch. 9).  A similar pattern may be detected in 
Ennistymon (Eiríksson 1996b).  By contrast Catherine Cox (1996) notes, on the basis of its 
registers, that the great majority of those who entered the North Dublin Union workhouse 
in a ‘healthy’ state during the Famine left it alive, implying that this workhouse was 
competently managed (compare Guinnane and Ó Gráda 2002b).  Both internal and 
                                                 
7 They will soon be available on the website of the Humanities Institute of Ireland, UCD 
(www.ucd.ie/hii). 
  6external evidence suggest that unions such as Enniskillen, Kilrush, and Ennistymon were 
very poorly managed.  Such studies were conducted in isolation, however; comparative 
analyses of workhouses are scarce. 
How to evaluate workhouse performance?8  One would not impose the same 
criteria on a workhouse during the Famine as on a hospital or nursing home in Ireland 
today or even a century ago.  Nor should one expect a workhouse in counties Mayo or 
Clare, where baseline poverty and the pressures caused by the famine were much greater, 
to perform as well as a workhouse in, say, counties Down or Antrim.  The present paper 
discusses and presents some preliminary evidence on five performance measures.  The 
first relates to the date when a workhouse opened for business, on the principle that late 
openings may have represented a lack of diligence or procrastination on the part of 
guardians.  The second measure focuses on the attendance of guardians at board meetings, 
on the assumption that lax attendance reduced the quality of board supervision of the 
workhouse.  The third relates to the probability of a board being dissolved by the Poor 
Law Commissioners for failure to discharge its functions.  The fourth invokes information 
assembled by Sir William Wilde and published in the 1851 census ‘Tables of Death’ on the 
causes of death in the workhouses during the Great Famine.  It posits a link between the 
quality of workhouse management and the proportion of workhouse deaths due to 
contagious or infectious disease.  The fifth relates to union indebtedness. 
 
1. OPENING FOR BUSINESS 
                                                 
8 This paper revisits a topic already broached in an earlier paper by Tim Guinnane and the present 
author (Guinnane and Ó Gráda 2002a).   
  7The first workhouse to open was that in Cork city (1st March 1840), closely followed 
by Dublin South (April 24th 1840) and Dublin North (May 4th 1840).  These three mainly 
urban unions piggybacked on earlier municipal provisions for poor relief.  The last to 
open was Clifden (on 8th March 1847), preceded by Glenties (July 24th 1846) and 
Cahirciveen (October 17th 1846).  This suggests a connection between relative peripherality 
and backwardness, on the one hand, and delays in opening for business, on the other.  
Workhouses in poorer regions were indeed slower to open, because local elites found it 




TABLE 1.  WORKHOUSE OPENING DATA AND WEALTH BY 
PROVINCE 
Province  Average Opening Date  Average PLV per head 
Leinster 9th March 1842  £2.38 
Munster 11th November 1842  £1.52 
Ulster 26th December 1842  £1.35 
Connacht 20th July 1843  £1.11 
 
 
Table 1 reports the average date of opening and average valuation per head for the 
four provinces.  The average opening day was earliest in Leinster, the richest province; it 
was latest in Connacht, the poorest.  The correlation across all 130 unions between poor 
law valuation per head (a convenient measure of relative wealth) and the date of opening 
was very high, -0.51.  Figure 1 below plots poor law valuation per head (AVGPLV) against 
the date of opening for inmates; Figure 2 plots AVGPLV against the total rates received per 
head of population up to 1846.  The amount collected per head ranged from less than £10 
  8in Tuam, Clifden, Enniskillen, Glenties, Lowtherstown, and Milford to over £150 in Dublin 
South, Dunshaughlin, Cork, and Dublin North.  Clearly, workhouses were quicker to open 
where living standards were higher and where rates had been collected abundantly.  The 
associated regressions are reported in Table 2. 
Among the laggards Tuam union was notorious: although a rate had been set in 
October 1842, and the workhouse declared fit for the reception of inmates in August 1842, 
no rates had been collected by the end of 1843.  The Commissioners dissolved the Tuam 
board of guardians in 1845 for failing to fulfill their obligations (Nicholls 1856: 295-6, 300, 
305).  Up to the end of 1846 Tuam had raised less in rates per head of population than any 
other union.   In other recalcitrant unions, the police and military were employed, with 
mixed success, to enforce the collection of rates. 











































TABLE 2.  WORKHOUSE OPENING DATES, RATES 
COLLECTED, AND INCOME  
 
 Dependent  Variable 
Variable  DATEOPEN DATEOPEN  DATEOPEN 


















N 130  130  130 
RsqAdj 0.254  0.337  0.492 
      
  
 
Although it had been projected for ‘completion’ by July 1842, Clifden’s workhouse 
did not open until March 1847, when the famine was at its peak.  In early November 1847, 
the Clifden guardians were meeting in the courthouse due to prevalence of fever in the 
workhouse, and the treasurer (who lived fifty miles away in Galway) had only £19 in 
hands.  But was the relative poverty of the area served by the workhouse partly 
responsible for the delay in its opening, and its subsequent failure to prevent the spread of 
disease?  A poor law inspector’s report dated Christmas Day 1847 absolved the guardians 
from some of the blame for the conditions facing inmates.  The workhouse lacked bedding 
and clothing, and accommodation was insufficient, but the guardians had tendered for 
clothing and bedding, and the builders who had been contracted to perform repair work 
  11were blaming the weather for delays.  The poor law inspector put the lack of sanitary 
facilities down to the ‘the idle laziness of the tradesmen’, and deemed Clifden’s problems 
‘almost inseparable from the locality in which the workhouse is placed…so distant as it is 
from towns where the guardians could supply themselves with materials and contractors 
for executing necessary works’.  He added that a medical assistant who had visited the 
workhouse a week previously had just died of typhus, and informed the commissioners 
that he would ‘now find it still more difficult to induce the Guardians to visit the house’.9  
A month later a visiting poor law inspector pleaded (in vain) with the Commissioners that 
‘the time has arrived when relief should be given to this Union in aid of rates’ (IUP3, p. 
289). 
Castlederg and Lurgan, on the other hand, are examples of workhouses located in 
relatively poor areas, yet early to open (2nd March 1841 and 22nd February 1842, 
respectively).  Other workhouses also opened much sooner than might be expected from 
their relative wealth, while some in relatively privileged areas were laggard.  Table 3 
reports the results of a simple exercise aimed at identifying ‘early-’ and ‘late-opening’ 
workhouses, after controlling for relative poverty.  The opening date was first regressed 
on average poor law valuation per head of population (AVGPLV) and the same term 
squared (AVGPLVSQ).  Then the differences (in days) between actual and expected 
opening date were ranked.  The table reports the twelve ‘best’ and ‘worst’ workhouses 
that emerge from this exercise.  Thus, for example, Castlederg workhouse in county 
Tyrone opened for pauper inmates over two years sooner than one might have predicted, 
                                                 
9 http://www.connemara.net/history/workhouse.php 
  12given its AVGPLV.  At the other extreme, Castlerea in county Roscommon was three years 
later than predicted by the model.  Six of the best performers were located in Ulster, four 
of the laggards in Connacht.  However, the earliest openers included Boyle in Connacht, 






TABLE 3. ‘EARLY’ AND ‘LATE’ OPENING WORKHOUSES 
 
‘Early’ Openings  ‘Laggard’ Openings 
Union Date  Opened  Residual  Union Date  Opened    Residual 
Castlederg  02/03/1841  882 Antrim  19/09/1843  -671 
Lurgan  22/02/1841  708 Swinford  14/04/1846  -703 
Omagh  24/08/1841  660 Mountmellick  03/01/1845  -716 
Gortin  19/02/1842  653 Letterkenny  14/05/1845  -787 
Kilrush  09/07/1842  600 Milford  06/04/1846  -842 
Scariff  11/05/1842  577 Lowtherstown  01/10/1845  -945 
Londonderry  10/11/1840  575 Enniskillen  01/12/1845  -957 
Magherafelt  11/03/1842  568 Killarney  05/04/1845  -969 
Cork  01/03/1840  566 Cahirciveen  17/10/1846  -1010 
Skibereen  19/03/1842  555 Clifden  08/03/1847  -1064 
Mohill  08/06/1842  545 Tuam  04/05/1846  -1093 




                                                 
10 In some cases there was a big delay between the workhouse being projected for ‘completion’ or 
‘declared fit for the reception of paupers’ and the first admission.  A case in point is Antrim where 
completion was planned for March 1842, eighteen months before the first pauper was admitted.  
Others laggards in this respect were Tralee, Roscommon, Macroom, and Athy. 
  132. ATTENDANCE AT BOARD MEETINGS   
In each union a board of guardians was responsible for the administration of the 
poor law at local level.  These boards contained a number of appointed or ex officio 
members (mostly members of the landed elite), but most guardians were elected by rate-
payers11.  The board members, who were unpaid, were responsible for the appointment of 
workhouse staff and of rate collectors, the negotiation of contracts, the setting of a poor 
rate, and the admission of pauper inmates. For some, board membership was a matter of 
noblesse oblige or civic duty; for others, a means of personal or political advancement.  Most 
guardians saw their task as one of squaring the legal requirement of each union to care for 
the destitute with keeping the burden on the ratepayers who elected them as low as 
possible.  One guardian complained in December 1846: ‘To tell the truth, it would be better 
for me and the ratepayers to send the paupers of our division to Brundley’s Hotel.  It 
would be as cheap as the way we are paying for them at present’ (Tipperary Vindicator, 30th 
December 1846, as cited in Grace 2000: 23).  Yet at the height of the famine, workhouse 
penny-pinching led to many cases of serving the poor inedible and contaminated food, 
depriving them of proper clothing and bedding, and burying them without coffins.   
While some guardians served out of a sense of duty, others were alive to the 
opportunities presented for clientelism and patronage.  Meetings were typically weekly, 
although in nearly all cases the number of meetings increased as the crisis intensified.  
Guardians elected before the famine were faced with responsibilities they had not 
reckoned on.  Although the day-to-day running of the workhouse was the responsibility 
                                                 
11 A useful source on workhouse history, which provides the numbers of ex officio and elected 
guardians in each union, is http://www.workhouses.org.uk. 
  14of the workhouse master and his small staff, the ultimate responsibility for management 
rested with the guardians.  
Strictly speaking, the attendance of all or most guardians at every meeting was not 
necessary.  Indeed, a full attendance on a regular basis might have impeded the business 
of the board.   Nevertheless, trends in attendance offer one guide to the attention paid by 
guardians to the affairs of the union.  From the outset, the performance of boards was 
mixed.  In many cases, there were complaints about lax attendance.   For example, on 12th 
November 1847 only three members attended a board meeting in Milford; four days 
earlier in Mohill it was only ‘only by the exertions of the master seeking for and inducing 
three of the Guardians to attend that a quorum could be formed’ (IUP3, pp. 117, 131).   In 
early 1848 Carrick-on-Shannon’s controversial poor law inspector, Captain Wynne, 
insisted that the board meet daily in order to administer out-door relief, which the board 
refused to do, whereupon Wynne asked for the board to be dissolved.  On 5th May 1848 
few ‘astounded’ guardians attended the meeting announcing their dissolution.  Most of 
the others were attending either a cattle show in Dublin or fairs locally (McAtasney 1997a; 
O’Brien 1999: 37).  
A comparative analysis of workhouse attendance, controlling for the distances 
guardians had to travel and the relative poverty of the union, would be very useful.  The 
relatively high survival rate of workhouse minute books makes such an exercise quite 
feasible.  Here, however, the analysis is limited to partial evidence from a small selection 
of workhouses.   The first, Ballinrobe, had a dismal record of attendance. A minute 
forwarded to Sir William Somerville on July 3rd 1847 noted seventeen scheduled meetings 
  15with no attendance; forty attended by only 3 to 6 guardians (out of 26 elected and eight ex 
officio guardians); eleven where the attendance ranged between eight and thirteen; and 
four where it ranged between fourteen and twenty (IUP1, p. 215).  This means that, 
excluding the meetings at which nobody attended, the average attendance was less than 
seven.  Ballinrobe’s board was dissolved on 23rd June 1847. 
Very different was the record in Drogheda, where the board met for the first time 
on 31st July 1839.   Between then and 23rd March 1843 the board, consisting of twenty-five 
elected guardians and a small number of ex officio guardians, met 112 times.  Members 
seem to have been allowed send other family members as substitutes.  The average 
attendance was an impressive fifteen or so.   
An analysis by Daniel Grace of the attendance at Nenagh between 31 March 1842 
and 18 February 1843 reports two guardians attending 42 and 46 meetings each out of a 
total of 47 and, at the other extreme, two more attending four and six meetings.  There was 
a geographical aspect to attendance.  The four guardians from the three most distant 
divisions attended an average of 13 meetings.  Some complained about frequent meetings 
interfering with their businesses (Grace 2000: 24). 
  16 






























  17Attendance at board meetings in Enniskillen during the Famine was also poor 
(PRONI, BG14/A/2).  The Enniskillen board consisted of forty guardians, thirty of whom 
were elected.  Average attendance between May 1845 and March 1848, when the board 
was dissolved, was only twelve.  The highest recorded attendance (31) was on 3rd August 
1847, when the main item on the agenda was a formal protest against pressure from the 
poor law commissioners to have what was deemed a high rate imposed on the union.  The 
next highest attendances were on 17th November 1845, when ‘tenders were opened for the 
supply of meal, potatoes, bread, turf etc.’, and on 7th Sept 1847, when ‘having been 
apprised that important business was to have been transacted, relative to the striking of 
rates and the appointment of relieving officers, there was a large number of guardians in 
attendance’ (Impartial Reporter, 20th November 1845; 9th September 1847).   But there were 
several occasions when only two, three or five guardians showed up, and when meetings 
had to be abandoned for want of a quorum.  In the wake of their visit on 16th March 1847 
the workhouse visiting committee pleaded that ‘some members of the Board would 
occasionally visit and report upon the state of the house’.  A month later one guardian 
proposed that at future meetings the board consider the claims of applicants for admission 
before moving to other business, ‘so as to secure the aid of a greater number of Guardians 
in the more strict scrutiny which is found necessary to make to prevent imposition’.12   On 
1st June 1847 only three members had assembled by two o’clock, when the meeting was 
adjourned.  No worthwhile business was conducted in August 1847 for the same reason.  
A meeting of the guardians in late August 1847 was cancelled because of ‘the small 
                                                 
12 PRONI, BG14/A/1, Rough minutes of Enniskillen Board of Guardians, 17 November 1846, 26 
January 1847, 16 March 1847, 31 August 1847, 28 September 1847. 
  18attendance of Guardians in consequence of the Lough Erne Regatta’.  On 25th January 1848 
‘no business of importance was transacted’ due to the poor attendance.  Only eight 
guardians attended the last meeting of the board prior to dissolution.   
Lax attendance at board meetings was by no means confined to Enniskillen, 
however.  In Waterford City, only two guardians could be relied on to attend regularly 
during the Famine.  The absentees placed enormous pressure on the few who did attend.  
The scale of business at a board meeting attended only by eleven out of a total 
membership of sixty or so in December 1847 led to a decision to meet four times weekly in 
future.   On St. Patrick’s Day 1848 only one guardian showed up, two less than the 
quorum of three.  The guardian was advised by a visiting poor law inspector to decide on 
applications on his own.  The following day he wrote to the inspector that he had relieved 
six hundred paupers, a task that had kept him at his desk until eleven in the evening 
(Byrne 1995: 125-7). 
Ballina poor law union, the most extensive in the country, is a special case.  Open 
relatively early (by November 1842), its workhouse had operated well below capacity 
before the Famine, but by late 1846 it was already nearly full, and short of bedding and 
clothes for its inmates.  Attendance in Ballina between March 1845 and December 1847 
averaged thirteen.   This was not a bad average, but low attendance from the remote Erris 
district was a problem.  The five-hour journey by coach to the workhouse in Ballina helps 
explain the lax attendance of Erris-based guardians.  One Erris guardian, Dennis Bingham, 
attended once in 1845 and once in 1846; three of the Reilly family of Belmullet served on 
the board, but between them they attended only three meetings in 1845-46.  In all, the four 
  19Erris guardians made it to Ballina only eight times in 1845 and 1846, and not once in 1847 
(Ó Gráda 1999: 76, 250fn84). 
According to a temporary poor law inspector, the Ballina guardians were 
‘principally men in the lower rank of life, whose occupations would preclude their 
devoting much time to public business’ (IUP2, p. 389).  This became an acute problem 
towards the end of 1847.  The inspector believed that ‘unless the Board meet more 
frequently and give more time to business, it is impossible that they can carry out the 
business of this large Union properly’, and told the Commissioners so in December 1847.  
When they demanded more frequent meetings, the inspector’s reaction was to ask for the 
appointment of paid vice-guardians as soon as possible, ‘without at all questioning the 
good intentions of the Guardians individually (which, as regards a large majority, I have 
no reason to do)’ (IUP2, p. 392).  The Ballina board was accordingly dissolved on 22nd 
December 1847.  Within less than two months the vice-guardians had run up a bill of 
£1,500, ‘exclusive of liabilities incurred by the former Board’ (IUP3, p. 200). 
 
 
3. DISMISSAL OF BOARDS OF GUARDIANS 
The Commissioners in Dublin dismissed boards of guardians only as a last resort.  
The most common grounds for dissolution were mounting debts, an inability to collect 
rates, refusal to strike a rate, and conditions in the workhouse (Kinealy 1994: 206-10).  By 
the end of 1848 thirty-four boards had been dissolved.  Most of those were located in the 
west where the famine conditions were worst.  Fourteen were in either Connacht or Clare; 
  20several others were in a cluster stretching from Lowtherstown in the north to Tullamore in 
the south, and another including Waterford, New Ross, Carlow, and Kilkenny.  Were the 
problems facing these unions self-inflicted, or due to circumstances beyond their control?   
Table 4 presents the results of modeling the probability of dissolution as a function 
of a range of variables, some truly exogenous and outside the guardians’ control, some 
arguably within their control.  RTO46POP is the total sum collected in rates to the end of 
1846; DR, the death rate in the workhouse between 1841 and 1851; and PROPSTARV, the 
proportion dying of starvation-related causes. The variable packing the most powerful 
explanatory punch was BALPOP, our measure of union indebtedness13: it alone produced 
a pseudo-R2 of 0.32.  This is an unsurprising result.  The addition of other variables, 
reflecting conditions in the union at large, increased pseudo- R2 to 0.48.  In other words, 
the guardians who laboured under the most challenging conditions were most likely to be 
dissolved.  Table 5 lists those unions linked to the ten biggest positive and negative 
residuals.  These are interpreted loosely as, respectively, unions administered by boards 
that were dissolved but should not have been, and boards which were not dissolved, but 
should have. 
                                                 
13 BALPOP is defined as the average of net indebtedness in the months of October and Deccember 
1847, and March and September 1848. 
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TABLE 4. MODELLING THE DISSOLUTION OF 
BOARDS 
Variable  Coefficients and t-values 
SOUP  1.704 
(1.49) 
BALPOP  6.825 
(3.40) 
AVGPLV  0.696 
(2.29) 
DR  23.23 
(2.00) 
AREA  1.89e-06 
(0.78) 
RTO46POP  -0.025 
(-2.15) 
PROPDDF  1.295 
(1.16) 
PROPSTARV  3.247 
(1.37) 
CONSTANT  -2.977 
(-3.93) 
N 119 
R-sq (robust)  0.495 
Prob >chi2  0.0000 
 
 
TABLE 5.  OUTLIERS (based on above) 
Rank  Dissolved but should 
not have been 
Should have been dissolved 
but were not 
1  Trim Killarney 
2  Tipp Sligo 
3  Cavan Swinford 
4  Lowtherstown Mullingar 
5  Granard Nenagh 
6  Cootehill Parsonstown 
7  Tullamore Kells 
8  Kilkenny Fermoy 
9  New Ross  Mountmellick 
10  Kanturk Kilmallock 
11  Longford Carrick-on-Suir 
12  Thurles Tralee 
  224. CAUSES OF DEATH IN THE WORKHOUSE 
  As noted earlier, a significant proportion of famine deaths were recorded in the 
workhouses.  This is only partly because many came to the workhouse in a dying state. As 
noted earlier, in some cases the lag between entry and death suggests that conditions in 
the workhouse were responsible for many deaths. The workhouses’ reputation in turn 
probably deterred some from entering them (Murphy 1996: 64).  Others arrived healthy, 
but succumbed to some infectious disease contracted in the workhouse.   This suggests 
another yardstick of workhouse performance: the proportion of deaths in workhouses due 
to infectious diseases.   
William Wilde compiled these data for his analysis of mortality in the 1851 census.  
Unlike the other data in the ‘Tables of Death’, their coverage is relatively complete.  
Scholars have not used them much so far (Mokyr and Ó Gráda 2002).  True, detailed data 
by cause of death for nine unions are lacking, and the data for another eight at least are of 
dubious quality.  Another shortcoming is that Wilde’s disaggregated workhouse data refer 
to the 1841-51 period as a whole, rather than the famine period.  These shortcomings are 
unlikely to distort the analysis of the data much, however.14
The mortality from contagious diseases also has an exogenous component: it was 
easier for a workhouse in, say, counties Down or Dublin to control mortality from 
infectious disease than one in Clare or Galway.   The correlation between AVGPLV and 
PROPEPID (the proportion of workhouse deaths due to ‘zymotic or epidemic, endemic 
and contagious diseases’) was about –0.26.  ‘Zymotic or epidemic, endemic and contagious 
                                                 
14 Table II of Wilde’s ‘Tables of Death’ records an additional 58,059 deaths in permanent and 
temporary fever hospitals, mostly from ‘fever’ in 1847-49. 
  23diseases’ were responsible for high proportions of all deaths in most unions in Connacht, 
Clare, and Kerry.  They also exacted heavy tolls in Donegal and Ballyshannon unions and, 
more surprisingly, Bailieborough and Oldcastle. 
The regression reported below in Table 6 models PROPEPID as a function of the 
degree of indebtedness in 1847-48 per head of population (BALPOP), the death rate in 
1841-51 (DR), poor law valuation per head (AVGPLV), and the proportion of the 
population on free soup rations on 3rd July 1847 (SOUP).  The gaps between predicted and 
actual values of PROPEPID are then used to identify ‘outlier’ unions whose record was 
better or worse than expected.   The top half of Table 7 reports those workhouses with the 
highest and lowest shares of death due to epidemic diseases.  The bottom half lists those 
that performed ‘best’ and ‘worst’ after controlling for background factors.  Note that the 
sharp differences between the top and bottom panels.  The poor record of workhouses like 
Bantry or Castlebar is partly accounted for by their extreme poverty; it is the high 
incidence deaths from epidemic disease in workhouses in relatively prosperous areas like 
Oldcastle or Dunshaughlin that is most striking in this respect. 
Also of interest are workhouses with high proportions of deaths from three causes linked 
directly to malnutrition: marasmus, dropsy, and outright starvation (Table 8).  Marasmus, 
listed as the cause of 16,288 workhouse deaths, is an often fatal form of protein 
malnutrition most likely to strike children; its symptoms of dry, loose skin, hair loss, and 
voracious hunger are unambiguous.  Marasmus often leads to dehydration and infection.  
Dropsy, responsible for 6,530 deaths, is an obsolete term for hunger edema.  The census 
recorded only 328 deaths from starvation in workhouses.  In over half of workhouses (77), 
  24no deaths from outright starvation were recorded, and only a single death was recorded in 
a further fourteen.  Well over half the deaths from starvation were recorded in four 
unions: Enniscorthy (55), Bandon (48), Parsonstown (41), and Listowel (38).  Clearly, these 
data are as much a function of how deaths were labeled by the responsible medical officer 
as any genuine difference in workhouse conditions.  However, deaths from marasmus and 
dropsy are good proxies for starvation deaths.  Note that the high proportions of deaths 
from starvation-linked conditions were outside the worst-hit areas.  Whether these deaths 
were due to poor workhouse fare or the starving condition of inmates on admission 




TABLE 6.  ACCOUNTING FOR THE 
VARIATION IN THE PROPORTION OF 
D-D-F DEATHS 
Variable Coefficient  t 
AVGPLV  -0.048 -2.08   
BALPOP  0.278 1.98   
SOUP  0.246 2.96   
CONST  0.398 7.67   
    
N 119   
R-squared (robust)  0.312   
Prob > F  0.0000   
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TABLE 7. UNIONS WITH HIGHEST AND LOWEST PERCENTAGES 
OF DEATHS FROM INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
Highest 12  Lowest 12 
Castlebar 0.80916  Navan  0.200717 
Bantry 0.806285  Dungannon  0.192584 
Ballinrobe 0.784384  Lismore  0.190476 
Roscommon 0.758871  Glenties  0.188679 
Enniskillen 0.75049  Downpatrick  0.182232 
Clifden 0.725707  Dublin  North  0.176267 
Westport 0.706576  Celbridge  0.153719 
Manorhamilton 0.692775  Cashel  0.141879 
Ballyshannon 0.681424  Newry  0.135052 
Galway 0.678788  Lisburn  0.130628 
Carrickonshannon 0.667413  Kilkenny  0.126214 
Monaghan 0.661765  Midleton  0.108747 
    
‘Worst’ 12  ‘Best’ 12 
Enniskillen 0.331696  Navan  -0.16858 
Dunshaughlin 0.312781  Dungannon  -0.18709 
Monaghan 0.302287  Lismore  -0.19523 
Manorhamilton 0.298517  Newcastlewest  -0.19961 
Ballyshannon 0.294839  Boyle  -0.20127 
Bantry 0.261465  Lisburn  -0.20653 
Skibbereen 0.239207  Newry  -0.22279 
Carrickonshannon 0.234909  Midleton  -0.2283 
Tipperary 0.222594  Kanturk  -0.24054 
Roscommon 0.2144  Kilkenny  -0.28678 
Oldcastle 0.205312  Glenties  -0.30649 
Ballinrobe 0.203278  Cashel  -0.3189 
    
The unions excluded for lack of reliable data are Athlone, Ballymena, 
Callan, Carlow, Castlerea, Dungarvan, Kilrush, Kinsale, Mohill, Scariff, 
and Waterford 
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TABLE 8.  WORKHOUSES WITH THE 
HIGHEST PROPORTIONS OF DEATHS 
FROM STARVATION, MARASMUS, 
AND DROPSY 










Gort   19.3 
 
 
Table 9, which focuses on Enniskillen poor law union, compares like with like.  It 
uses the neighbouring workhouses of Clogher, Lowtherstown, and Lisnaskea, situated in 
unions with a comparable poor law valuation per head.  On this reckoning, the Enniskillen 
guardians performed poorly.  Adding the percentages dying of diarrhea, dysentery, and 
fever (DDF) to those dying from marasmus, dropsy, and starvation (MDS) places 
Enniskillen in a very poor light compared to its three neighbours.  In Clogher the 
percentages succumbing to starvation-linked diseases was also high, but the proportions 
dying from DDF were much lower.  In Lisnaskea the proportions dying from DDF was 
almost as high as in Enniskillen, but the share of MDS was modest. 
 
 
  275.  UNION INDEBTEDNESS 
As noted earlier, the unions that bore the brunt of the crisis were also most likely to 
be those constrained by debt.  Indebtedness was linked to poverty.  The correlation 
between debt per head in October 1847 and average poor law per head was -0.36; in 
September 1848 it was –0.24.  The associated elasticities, 1.6 and 0.9, respectively, imply 
that the effect was ‘big’.  Modelling union indebtedness in 1847-48 (BALPOP) as a function 
of factors exogenous to union management, AVGPLV, SOUP, PROPEPD, and 
PROPSTARV produced the result reported in Table 9.  The signs of all coefficients are 
‘right’, and the explanatory power of the regression considerable.  Table 10 then reports 
the results of using the difference between the actual and predicted values of BALPOP 
from [2] to identify unions that performed ‘better’ and ‘worse’ than expected. 
 
 
TABLE 10.  MODELLING UNION 
INDEBTEDNESS 
Variable  Coefficients and t- 
statistics 
SOUP  0.230 
(3.38) 
PROPDDF  0.164 
(2.12) 
PROPSTARV  0.186 
(1.29) 
DATEOPEN  0.000033 
(1.90) 
CONST  0.592 
(2.28) 
N 119 
R-squared (robust)  0.316 
Prob > F  0.0000 
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TABLE 11. ‘Highest’ and ‘Worst’ Debtor Unions 
‘HIGHEST’ ‘LOWEST’ 
Union BALPOP  Union  BALPOP 
Gort -0.45876  Monaghan  0.076611 
Galway -0.40057  Ballycastle  0.0804 
Castlebar -0.36202  Rathkeale  0.083463 
Bantry -0.34124  Trim  0.088489 
Newcastlewest -0.32675  Ballinasloe  0.109456 
Roscommon -0.29362  Wexford  0.116047 
Carrick-on-Shannon -0.27278  Naas  0.124244 
Tuam -0.26345  Bandon  0.132845 
Kenmare -0.2609  Strabane  0.145237 
Clifden -0.24219  Clonmel  0.171105 
Ennistymon -0.23939  Midleton  0.219679 
Navan -0.21894  Mallow  0.285042 
‘BEST’ ‘WORST’ 
Union Residual  Union  Residual 
Mallow -0.37174  Shillelagh  0.13052 
Midleton -0.238001  Castleblaney  0.13511 
Clonmel -0.206768  Castlebar  0.14516 
Rathkeale -0.191433  Carrickonshannon  0.14881 
Macroom -0.191161  Abbeyleix  0.15119 
Ballinasloe -0.174913  Cashel  0.15539 
Bandon -0.167435  Kilkenny  0.16257 
Dunfanaghy -0.166408  Bantry  0.17903 
Monaghan -0.149202  Newcastlewest  0.20301 
Wexford -0.141243  Navan  0.21171 
Strabane -0.135721  Galway  0.21587 







The decision by Lord John Russell’s administration to force famine relief on to the 
poor law, without cross-subsidizing the poorer unions, was a disastrous one (Donnelly 
2002: 103-6).  It meant that workhouses could not provide a safe haven for the destitute.  
Conditions in many workhouses, in turn, were such that thousands chose to die outside 
  29them rather than submit to the risks and the hardships of indoor relief.  The stigma that 
attached to the regime ever after speaks volumes (Ó Gráda 2006: ch. 11).  This is the 
greatest indictment of the workhouse system.  At the same time, clearly there was room 
for human action at the local level.  Local case studies point to unions that were 
conscientiously run, even against great odds, and to others which were subject to neglect.  
However, the endogeneity of human agency in the circumstances of the 1840s is also clear.   
The goal of this paper has been to propose different ways in which workhouse 
performance might be evaluated, due allowance being made for background conditions.  
The correlations between performances as measured by four of our criteria (see below) are 
all statistically significant, though low enough to suggest that a judgment on the basis of 
any single criterion may be misleading.  Table 13 accordingly lists the twelve worst 
performers by three criteria.  Six unions (Castlebar, Bantry, Galway, Enniskillen, Clifden, 
and Carrick-on-Shannon) appear at least twice, and this is taken as tentative evidence for 




TABLE 12. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN YARDSTICKS 
  DATEOPEN DISSOLVED  BALPOP47  PROPEPID 
DATEOPEN  1.000      
DISSOLVED  0.322 1.000     
BALPOL47  0.325 0.579  1.000  
PROPEPID  0.331 0.423  0.419 1.000 
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TABLE 13. WORST-PERFORMING BY THREE YARDSTICKS 
OPENING DATE  DDF DEATHS  DEBT 
Castlerea  Castlebar  Gort 
Tuam  Bantry Galway 
Clifden  Ballinrobe Navan 
Cahirciveen Roscommon  Newcastlewest 
Killarney  Enniskillen Bantry 
Enniskillen  Clifden  Kilkenny 
Lowtherstown Westport  Cashel 
Milford Manorhamilton  Abbeyleix 
Letterkenny Ballyshannon Carrick-on-shannon 
Mountmellick  Galway Castlebar 
Swinford  Carrick-on-shannon  Castleblaney 
Antrim Monaghan  Shillelagh 
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TABLE 9.  CAUSES OF DEATH IN ENNISKILLEN AND NEIGHBOURING WORKHOUSES 
  ENNISKILLEN      LISNASKEA LOWTHERSTOWN CLOGHER 
Cause  of  Death          M  F M F M F M  F
Dysentery  138            114 164 145 77 64  25  34
Diarrhoea                  207 156 6 7 0 0 30 15
Fever  240                276 84 105 112 114 50 59
Measles                 69 58 3 3 56 39 1 3
Smallpox                  42 37 1 0 7 14 2 8
Marasmus                  68 59 11 11 0 2 23 17
Dropsy                  55 38 16 3 2 5 19 11
Starvation            
Deaths  from  Known  Causes                  1017 979 485 443 417 380 325 312
            
[1] Deaths from Diarrhoea-
Dysentery-Fever (%) 
57.5                55.8 52.4 58.0 45.3 46.8 32.3 34.6
[2] Deaths from Marasmus-
Dropsy-Starvation (%) 
12.1               9.9 5.8 3.2 0.5 1.8 12.9 9.0
[3]    [1]+[2]  67.6                65.7 58.2 61.2 45.8 48.6 45.2 43.6
Poor Law Valuation (£)  96,108  46,919  43,994  42,278 
Population          81,534 37,920 34,963 39,801
PLV per head (£)  1.18  1.24  1.26  1.06 
 
 
 
 
  34